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Abstract 
In this paper I use a medium scale open economy DSGE model developed by Baksa, 
Benk and Jakab (2010) for the Hungarian economy. This model provides a notable degree of 
disaggregation both on the government revenue and expenditure side, being able to capture the 
shocks that come from fiscal policy decisions. 
My contributions can be summed up in the following three actions. First of all, I estimated the 
model for the Romanian economy, using Bayesian techniques. Secondly, I determined the 
parameters of fiscal feedback rules in order to establish if the automatic stabilizers work 
properly. And thirdly, I tried to analyze the impulse response functions in order to assess the 
effects of different fiscal policy measures on the most important macroeconomic variables.  
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1. Introduction 
The fiscal authorities of many countries were coerced by the actual financial crisis to 
implement fiscal consolidation or a fiscal stimulating plan in order to ensure fiscal stability. 
Thus, to reduce the budgetary disequilibrium, fiscal authorities have the possibility of reducing 
public spending or/and to increase taxes; but having these possibilities, one can ask himself 
“which spending items should be reduced?” or/and “which taxes should be increased?”, but most 
importantly one must find the answer to the question “what implications will these changes have 
on the economy?”  
Many countries have already implemented fiscal policy measures, such as cuts in public 
wages and investments, cuts in public employment, rise of taxation rates etc., which have a 
major impact on economy. In this context it is interesting and also necessary to study how the 
fiscal policy shocks are transmitted in economy, as well as their impact on the macroeconomic 
framework. Moreover, this topic has generated intense debates among economists and there are 
various approaches to this problem. 
One of the most popular methods used to evaluate the impact of fiscal policy measures on 
the economy is that of Blanchard and Perotti (1999). In their study, they use structural VAR 
models and argue that government spending increases have a positive effect on the output, while 
tax increases have a negative effect. This article was a starting point for many studies, such as 
Giuliodori and Beetsma (2004), Romer and Romer (2007), Caldara and Camps (2008), but the 
method is also subject to many criticisms.  
Also, in the last years, the DSGE models have become a reliable tool for evaluating 
economic policy measures and most recently a series of articles analyze the fiscal policy issues. 
An important advantage of this approach is that the DSGE models are not subject to Lucas 
critique, these being able to model the behavior of economic agents and to incorporate their 
expectations.  
Given the economic development of Romania during recent years, I consider that is 
necessary and relevant to implement a DSGE model in order to quantify the effects of different 
fiscal policy shocks on the most important macroeconomic variables. Thus, I would like to adjust 
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the model created by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010) for the Hungarian economy according to the 
specific features of our economy.  
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the effects of fiscal policy actions using a 
model with a notable degree of disaggregation, both on the government revenue and expenditure 
side. Also, using fiscal feedback rules that share similar characteristics with the Taylor rule in 
monetary economics, I would like to estimate the feedback parameters that capture the automatic 
stabilizing effects. Thus, this paper should be a step towards estimating the government behavior 
based on quarterly fiscal data. 
The present paper is organized as follows: section two gives a brief of relevant literature, 
section three describes the DSGE model used by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010), section four 
gives details on data used, calibration and estimation procedures, as well as the estimation 
results. In section five, I present an analysis of impulse response functions, while in section six I 
state my conclusions, taking into account the results from the previous section. 
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2. Literature Review 
Among economists there is a lack of consensus on the stabilizing effects of fiscal policy 
measures in the form of spending decrease or tax increase. In more recent years, DSGE models 
have become a reliable tool for evaluating fiscal policy measures, and that‟s because, now, these 
models include a more developed fiscal policy block. 
Such a case is the one of Baksa, Benk and and Jakab (2010) who estimated a DSGE 
model for the Hungarian economy (being an extended version of the model proposed by Smets 
and Wouters (2003)) with a disaggregated fiscal policy block. If, in other models, the fiscal block 
appears only implicitly (the fiscal authority collect lump sum taxes and give transfers), here the 
fiscal policy is modeled explicitly by introducing three types of tax rates (personal income tax 
rates, social contribution rate paid by employers and VAT) and two types of expenditures (social 
transfers and goods and services expenditure). For each item of revenue and expenditure a fiscal 
rule was implemented (a fiscal reaction function). 
Thomassi Stahler (2011) presents in his paper a model, jointly developed by Banco de 
España and Deutsche Bundesbank staff, used for fiscal policy simulations. This model provide a 
better disaggregation on the fiscal expenditure side, including some components like public 
investment, public purchases of goods and services, public sector wage bill, and transfers. 
Forni, Gerali and Pisani (2010) created a model for Italian economy (based on Global 
Economy Model developed by IMF) used to simulate the macroeconomic and welfare 
implications of different fiscal consolidation scenarios. This model considers that Italy is a 
member of euro area and takes into account the role of the common monetary policy and the 
spillovers from the rest of the area. 
Stork (2011) developed Hubert, a simple DSGE model for the Czech Republic used to 
simulate different macroeconomic scenarios at the Ministry of Finance; this model has a good 
representation of fiscal policy block. 
Other relevant studies are the following: Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2010), who presents a 
procedure to determine fiscal policy feedback rules for tax instruments, Iwata (2009), who 
studies the impact of fiscal policy measures on Japan economy, Zubairy (2009), who estimates a 
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DSGE model that features a rich fiscal policy block and a transmission mechanism for 
government spending shocks and calculates the multiplier for spending shock. 
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3. The Model 
In this section I present the model used by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010), which is an 
extended version of the DSGE model presented in Smets and Wouters (2003). 
This model includes a series of specific features as in the model developed by Smets and 
Wouters (2003), but some notable differences can be found. Thus, it incorporates rigidities like: 
habit formation, investment adjustment cost, capital utilization rate, price and wage settings as in 
Calvo (1983), indexation mechanisms in prices and wages. 
Baksa, Benk and Jakab extended the model of Smets and Wouters (2003) mainly by 
introducing a more developed fiscal policy block, designed to capture the shocks coming from 
fiscal policy decisions. If in other models the fiscal block appears only implicitly (the fiscal 
authority collect lump sum taxes and give transfers), here the fiscal policy is modeled explicitly 
by introducing three types of tax rates (personal income tax rates, social contribution rate paid by 
employers and VAT) and two types of expenditures (social transfers and Government 
expenditure). For each item of revenue and expenditure a fiscal rule was implemented (a fiscal 
reaction function).  
In this model, the imports are treated as intermediate products as in McCallum and 
Nelson (2001). In their paper they argue that in the standard set-up (in most models, imports are 
treated as final consumer goods) only a subset of the consumer price index is sticky, while in this 
approach the import prices influence the overall inflation via their impact on potential output. So, 
in this approach, the consumer price index is the relevant price index for produced goods. 
Another feature of this model is that the agents can learn the inflation trend gradually by 
applying an adaptive algorithm. The perceived trend of inflation depends on the current deviation 
of inflation from its trend and on the previous period inflation trend. 
As was pointed in IMF Country Report No. 08/314 “Hungary: selected issues (2008)” a 
disadvantage of the model is that it does not include a block with partner-country dynamics. 
The model describes the behavior of four categories of players: households, firms, 
government (represented by central bank and fiscal authority) and external market. The 
loglinearized equations around their steady state are in Annex I. 
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3.1 Households 
The economy is populated by a continuum of households of measure one indexed by   
𝑡 ∈  0,1 .. We assume that a part 1-ω of households is Ricardian (approximately 75%) and they 
have access to financial markets. The remaining households are liquidity-constrained and they 
spend their entire current disposable income on consumption. 
We suppose that Ricardian households have an identical preference toward consumption and 
leisure. They decide on labor supply and on consumption of goods, by maximizing the following 
utility function: 
                                    βtE0 (1 + ηt
c  
 Ct
o  j −hC t−1
o  j  
1−σ
1−σ
 −  1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑙   
Lt
1+φ
 j 
1+φ
 ) 
∞
𝑡=0
                        (3.01) 
where β is the discount factor, ct
o j  represents the real consumption of consumer j, h measures 
the habit formation in consumption, Lt(j) is the labor supplied by household j, σ is the inter-
temporal elasticity of consumption and 𝜑 denotes the inter-temporal elasticity of labor. 
In this expression, η
t
c   is the preference shock to consumption, while 𝜂𝑡
𝑙  is the preference 
shock to labour supply and these are modeled as a first order autoregressive process. The 
preference shock of consumption (the shock to consumer‟s impatience level) affects the marginal 
disutility of labor and the marginal utility of consumption. These preference shocks imply that 
households‟ consumption and employment valuation may vary over time.   
The Ricardian household faces with the following budget constraint: 
 1 + 𝜏𝑡
𝑐 𝑃𝑡𝑐𝑡
𝑜 𝑗 + 𝑃𝑡𝐼𝑡 𝑗 +
𝐵𝑡 𝑗 
1 + 𝑖𝑡
+
𝐵𝑡
𝑠 𝑗 
1 + 𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝐵𝑡−1 𝑗 + 𝐵𝑡−1
𝑠  𝑗 +  1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑙 𝑊𝑡 𝑗 𝐿𝑡 𝑗  
+ 𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝑢𝑡 𝑗 𝑘𝑡−1 𝑗 − Ψ 𝑢𝑡 𝑗  𝑃𝑡𝑘𝑡−1 𝑗 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡 −𝑂𝑇𝑡  (3.02) 
where 𝜏𝑡
𝑐 , 𝜏𝑡
𝑙  denotes consumption respectively labor income tax rates, 𝑃𝑡  is the aggregate price 
level, 𝐼𝑡 𝑗  is the investment level, 𝐵𝑡 𝑗  is the nominal bond, 𝐵𝑡
𝑠 𝑗  is the home country‟s 
nominal net foreign asset position, 𝑖𝑡  is the nominal interest rate, 𝑖𝑡
∗ is the foreign interest rate,  
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𝑟𝑡
𝑘  is the rental rate of capital, Ψ 𝑢𝑡 𝑗   
2
is the cost of the capital utilization rate 𝑢𝑡 𝑗 , 𝑘𝑡  is the 
stock of capital, 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡  denotes the dividends and 𝑂𝑇𝑡  denotes a lump-sum tax. 
So, the individual households receive wages for their work, dividends, capital income and 
interest income and they pay an income and a consumption tax (VAT) to the government. 
Ricardian households have access to financial markets and they can to maximize their lifetime 
utilities deciding on consumption, labor supply, domestic and foreign bond holding, investment, 
capital stock and capital utilization rate. 
In this model, the households act as investors, lending out the capital to the firm and earning 
rental rate from this. The physical capital accumulation law is given by the following dynamic 
equation: 
                                                    𝐾𝑡 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡−1 +  1 − S  
 1+ηI t It j 
It−1 j 
  It(𝑗)                          (3.03) 
where 𝛿 is the depreciation rate and S represents the investment adjustment cost function3 that 
have the following form: 
S 
 1 + ηI t It
It−1
 =
ϕ
2
 
 1 + ηI t It j 
It−1 j 
− 1 
2
 
and ηt
I
 is a shock to the adjustment function. 
Households maximize the utility function subject to the budget constraint and to capital 
motion. Solving the maximization problem of consumers and taking derivatives with respect to 
decision variables yields the following first order conditions: 
Derivative with respect to bt:  we obtain the Euler equation 
                                                                       𝜆𝑡 = 𝛽 1 + 𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑡  
𝜆𝑡+1
1+𝜋𝑡+1
        (3.04) 
where 𝜆𝑡  is the marginal utility of consumption in period t. 
                                                             
2
 Ψ 𝑢𝑡 𝑗  = 𝑟𝑡
𝑘𝜓  exp  
𝑢𝑡−1
𝜓
 − 1  , 𝜓 = Ψ′(1)/Ψ′′ (1) 
3 S  
 1+ηI t It
It−1
  is a function that transforms investment into capital. The investment adjustment cost function is 
assumed to satisfy S (1) = S’ (1) = 0. 
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Derivate with respect to 𝑏𝑡
𝑠   : 
                                                                 𝜆𝑡𝑒𝑡
1
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜆𝑡+1𝛽𝑒𝑡+1   
1
1+𝜋𝑡+1
                                    (3.05) 
Combining this relation with the derivative with respect to  𝑏𝑡
𝑠  yields the UIP condition: 
                                                                               
1+𝑖𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ =
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑒𝑡
           (3.06) 
Derivative with respect to 𝑐𝑡
𝑜 : 
𝐶𝑡
𝑜 𝑗  𝐴 + 𝑕 = 𝐶𝑡+1
𝑜  𝑗 + 𝑕𝐴𝐶𝑡−1
𝑜  𝑗   , where𝐴 =  
 1−𝜆𝑡  1+𝜏𝑡
𝑐   1+ηc t 
𝑕𝛽 1+ηc t+1 
 
−
1
𝜍
   (3.07) 
Derivative with respect to 𝐼𝑡 :         (3.08) 
𝜆𝑡
 1 + 𝜏𝑡
𝑐 
𝑄𝑡  1 − ΦI  
 1 + ηI t It
It−1
 − Φ′I  
 1 + ηI t It
It−1
 
 1 + ηI t It
It−1
 
=
𝜆𝑡
 1 + 𝜏𝑡
𝑐 
− 𝛽𝐸𝑡
𝜆𝑡+1
 1 + 𝜏𝑡+1
𝑐  
 𝑄𝑡+1Φ
′
I  
 1 + ηI t+1 It+1
It
  
 1 + ηI t+1 I
2
t+1
I2t
   
Derivative with respect to kt:  we obtain the shadow price of capital 
                             𝑄𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡
𝜆𝑡+1
𝜆𝑡
 𝑄𝑡+1 1 − 𝛿 + 𝑟𝑡+1
𝑘 𝑢𝑡+1 − Ψ 𝑢𝑡+1 𝑗         (3.09) 
Derivative with respect to 𝑢𝑡 𝑗 : we obtain the capital utilization level (the marginal cost of 
capital utilization is equal to the rental rate) 
                                                                                  𝑟𝑡
𝑘 = Ψ′ 𝑢𝑡 𝑗           (3.10) 
A part of households (ω) are liquidity-constrained and they spend their entire current 
disposable income (wages and transfers) on consumption. This kind of agents is modeled as non-
optimizing and their budget constraint is given by: 
                                                        1 + 𝜏𝑡
𝑐 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡
𝑛𝑜  𝑗 =  1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑙 𝑊𝑡 𝑗 𝐿𝑡 𝑗 +
𝑇𝑅𝑡
1−𝜛
      (3.11) 
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Wage setting 
Each household supplies a differentiated labor service to domestic firms. These different 
types of labor are sold to an employment agency (labor aggregator) that transforms them into a 
composite labor good using the following CES function (Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator function): 
                                                                      𝐿𝑡 =   𝐿(𝑗)𝑡
𝜃𝑤−1
𝜃𝑤 𝑑𝑗
1
0
 
𝜃𝑤
𝜃𝑤−1
                            (3.12) 
where 𝜃𝑤  denotes the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor. 
The employment agency solves a cost minimization problem (it minimizes the labor cost 
(wage) to obtain a unit of labor) and obtains the individual demand for each labor service 
supplied by household j:  
                                                                           𝐿𝑡 𝑗 =  
𝑊𝑡
𝑊𝑡 𝑗  
 
𝜃𝑤
𝐿𝑡                                                (3.13) 
where 𝑊𝑡  is the aggregate wage index expressed as: 
                                                                 𝑊𝑡 =   𝑊𝑡 𝑗 
1−𝜃𝑤𝑑𝑗
1
0
 
1
1−𝜃𝑤                             (3.14) 
Following Calvo (1983), households can re-optimize their wage at a given date with 
probability 1 − 𝛾𝑤  when they receive a random signal to change their wage. If a household 
cannot re-optimize its wage then it will adjust its wage according to the following rule of thumb 
that supposes an indexation with the perceived trend of inflation: 
                                                  𝑊𝑇 𝑖 =  𝑊𝑡 𝑖 Π𝑇,𝑡
𝐼𝑤 =  𝑃𝑡 𝑖 Π𝑇
𝐼𝑤Π𝑇−1
𝐼𝑤 … Π𝑡
𝐼𝑤        (3.15) 
where Π𝑇
𝐼𝑤 =  
Π𝑡
𝑤
Π 𝑡
 
𝜗𝑤
Π 𝑡+1, Π𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑊𝑡/𝑊𝑡−1, 𝜗𝑤   represents the degree of indexation according to 
past inflation, and Π 𝑡  s the perceived trend of inflation. 
The agents learn inflation trend gradually, by applying an adaptive algorithm. The 
perceived trend of inflation depends on the current deviation of inflation from trend and on the 
previous period inflation trend: 
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                                         1 + 𝜋𝑡    =   1 + 𝜋𝑡−1       
𝜌𝜋  
 1+𝜋𝑡  
 1+𝜋𝑡−1        
 
𝑔
                            (3.16)                            
where 𝜋𝑡    is the trend inflation, 𝜌𝜋  is the persistence of trend inflation, g denotes the learning 
speed parameter. 
If the household can to re-optimize its wage, then it will maximize its lifetime utility 
function taking as given the nominal wage and the labor: 
             max (𝛾
𝑤
β)T−tEt (1 + ηt
c  
ωo U HT
o  +ωno U(HT
no )
ωo +ωno
 −  1 − 𝜂𝑡
𝑙   
Lt
1+φ j 
1+φ
 ) 
∞
𝑡=0
           (3.17) 
subject to the budget constraint, capital accumulation law and to the labor demand equation. 
The wage chosen by household in this period will remain unchanged T-t periods in the future, 
with a probability of 𝛾𝑤 . 
From the first order conditions of the problem, we obtain that the re-optimized aggregate wage 
can be described by the following recursive form:  
                                                                    𝒲𝑡 =  
𝜃𝑤
𝜃𝑤−1
ℒ𝑡
𝑤1
ℒ𝑡
𝑤2 
1+𝜃𝑤𝜑
          (3.18) 
where    ℒ𝑡
𝑤1 =  1 + ηt
c  1 − 𝜂
𝑡
𝑙  ℒt
φ+1
+ 𝛾𝑤  βEt    
Π𝑡+1
𝑤
Πt
𝐼𝑤  
𝜃𝑤  1+𝜑 −1
ℒ𝑡+1
𝑤1     (3.19) 
ℒ𝑡
𝑤2 =  1 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑙 Λ𝑡
𝐿 ℒt + 𝛾𝑤  βEt    
Π𝑡+1
𝑤
Πt
𝐼𝑤  
𝜃𝑤−1
ℒ𝑡+1
𝑤2          (3.20) 
From the definition of the aggregate wage index, the law of motion for the aggregate wage index 
is:  
                                                            𝒲𝑡
1−𝜃𝑤 =
1−𝛾𝑤 
Π𝑡+1
𝑤
Π t
𝐼𝑤  
𝜃𝑤−1
1−𝛾𝑤
      (3.21) 
Finally, the log-linear wage Phillips curve is given by:     (3.22) 
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𝜋𝑡
𝑤 =
 1 − 𝛾𝑤  1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑤 
𝛾𝑤 1 + 𝜃𝑤𝜑  1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑤 
 𝜑𝐿𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑙 +
𝜍
1 − 𝑕
 𝑐 𝑡
𝑙 − 𝑕𝑐 𝑡−1
𝑙  +
𝜏𝑐
1 + 𝜏𝑐
𝜏𝑡
𝑐 +
𝜏𝑙
1 + 𝜏𝑙
𝜏𝑡
𝑙 + 𝜉𝑡
𝑤 
+
𝛽
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑤  
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤 +
𝜗𝑤
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑤 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑤  
where 𝑐 𝑡
𝑙 =
𝜛𝑜  𝑐𝑜 −𝜍𝑐𝑡
𝑜 +𝜛𝑛𝑜  𝑐𝑛𝑜  −𝜍 𝑐𝑡
𝑛𝑜 
𝜛𝑜  𝑐𝑜 −𝜍+𝜛𝑛𝑜  𝑐𝑛𝑜  −𝜍
 represent the weighted marginal utility of consumption 
and  𝜋 𝑡
𝑤 =
𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡−1
𝜋𝑡   denotes the wage inflation while 𝜉𝑡
𝑤  denotes the mark-up shock. 
 
3.2 Firms 
In this model, production takes place in two stages. In the first stage, a homogenous 
intermediate good is created in a perfectly competitive industry using labor and imports as 
inputs. In the second phase, the intermediate good is sold to the final good producers who 
combine it with the capital supplied by households and produce differentiated goods in a 
monopolistically competitive industry. 
There is a continuum of intermediate good producing firm that uses labor and imports as 
inputs. Labor is supplied by an employment agency that hires differentiated labor from 
households and aggregates it into homogeneous labor good.  
Imports are offered by the importing firms that buy differentiated external goods and 
services and aggregate it into homogeneous import good. The final imported good is a Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregate: 
                                                                       𝑚𝑡 =   𝑚𝑡 𝑖 
𝜃−1
𝜃 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜃
𝜃−1
     (3.23) 
From the cost minimization problem result the demand for individual imported consumption 
good:  𝑚𝑡 𝑖 =  
𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠
𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠  𝑖 
 
𝜃
𝑚𝑡  , where 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠  is the aggregate foreign-currency price expressed as: 
                                                                       𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠 =   𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠  𝑖 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜃
      (3.24) 
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There, the foreign-currency price of imported inputs is expressed as a first order autoregressive 
process. 
The composite intermediate input is produced in a competitive industry by the following 
CES technology:          (3.25) 
𝑧𝑡 =  𝑎
1
𝜌𝑧   1 + 𝜙1 
−1𝐿𝑡  
𝜌𝑧−1
𝜌𝑧 +  1 − 𝑎 
1
𝜌𝑧   1 + 𝜙2 
−1𝑚𝑡  
𝜌𝑧−1
𝜌𝑧  
𝜌𝑧
𝜌𝑧−1
 
where 𝑎 denotes the share of labor used in production, 𝜌𝑧  is the substitution elasticity between 
the factors and 𝜙1, 𝜙2are the adjustment costs. 
Solving the cost minimization problem yields the marginal cost of the intermediate product and 
the demand for each production factor: 
The marginal cost of the intermediate product is:      (3.26) 
𝑤𝑧 =  𝑎𝑤 𝑡
1−𝜌𝑧 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑞𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠     1−𝜌𝑧 
1
1−𝜌𝑧  
where:   𝑤𝑡   =
 1+𝜏𝑡
𝑠 𝑤𝑡
 1+𝜙1 
−1−𝐿𝑡  1+𝜙1 
−2𝜙 ′1
  denotes the effective wage, and 
 𝑞𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠        =
𝑞𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠
 1+𝜙2 
−1−𝑚 𝑡 1+𝜙2 
−2𝜙 ′2
  is the effective import price. 
Labor demand has the form of:        (3.27) 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝑎  
𝑤𝑡
𝑧
𝑤 𝑡
 
𝑧
𝜌𝑧
𝑧𝑡 1 + 𝜙1  
And import demand equation is:        (3.28) 
𝑚𝑡 =  1 − 𝑎  
𝑤𝑡
𝑧
𝑞𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠        
 
𝑧
𝜌𝑧
𝑧𝑡 1 + 𝜙2  
The continuum of differentiated final goods 𝑦𝑡 𝑖  is produced in a monopolistically 
competitive market and each 𝑦𝑡 𝑖  is made by an individual firm. The composite good is bought  
by the final goods producers and combined through a CES production function with the 
accumulated capital supplied by households:       (3.29) 
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𝑦𝑡 𝑖 =  1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴  𝛼
1
𝜌  𝐾𝑡 𝑖         
𝜌−1
𝜌 +  1 − 𝛼 
1
𝜌  𝑧𝑡  
𝜌−1
𝜌  
𝜌
𝜌−1
− yf   
where 𝜂𝑡
𝐴  is a productivity shock, 𝛼 denotes the share of capital used in production, 𝜌 denotes the 
substitution elasticity and f    is the fixed cost of production. 
Solving the cost minimization problem yields the marginal cost of the final product and the 
demand for each production factor: 
The real marginal cost of final goods is:       (3.30) 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 =  
1
1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴 (𝛼 𝑟𝑡
𝑘 
1−𝜌
+ (1 − 𝛼)  𝑤𝑡
𝑧 1−𝜌  ) )
1
𝜌−1 
where  𝑟𝑡
𝑘  is the rental fee. 
 Capital demand is:          (3.31) 
𝑢𝑡𝑘𝑡 =
𝛼  
𝑚𝑐𝑡
𝑟𝑡
𝑘  
𝜌
 𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝑦𝑓 
 1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴 1−𝜌
 
where 𝐷𝑃𝑡 =   
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡  𝑖 
 
𝜃
𝑑𝑖
1
0
 is the prices’ dispersion.  
The intermediate product demand is:        (3.32) 
𝑧𝑡 =
(1 − 𝛼)  
𝑚𝑐𝑡
𝑤𝑡
𝑧  
𝜌
 𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝑦𝑓 
 1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝐴 1−𝜌
 
The aggregate final good 𝑦𝑡  is produced in a competitive market from a continuum of 
differentiated final goods 𝑦𝑡 𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈  0,1 .Retailers buy differentiated final goods from producers, 
aggregate and sell them to households, government or exporters: 
                                                             𝑦𝑡 =   𝑦𝑡 𝑖 
𝜃−1
𝜃 𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
𝜃
𝜃−1
       (3.33) 
where θ>1 denotes the substitution elasticity between different kind of goods. 
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The demand for each individual final good is obtained from a cost minimization problem: 
       𝑦𝑡 𝑖 =  
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡 𝑖 
 
𝜃
𝑦𝑡            (3.34) 
where 𝑃𝑡 =   𝑃𝑡 𝑖 
1−𝜃𝑑𝑖
1
0
 
1
1−𝜃
 is the (composite) price index and 𝑃𝑡(𝑖) represents the price of 
differentiated good i. 
Price setting 
As in the model of Calvo (1983), we assume that prices are sticky. Each producer of 
differentiated final good changes its price at a given date in a rational way with a constant 
probability of 1 − 𝛾𝑑 . The price chosen by firm i in this period remain unchanged T-t periods in 
the future, with a probability 𝛾𝑑 .If a firm cannot re-optimize its price at the given date, it will 
follow a rule of thumb. Rule of thumb price setters‟ increase their prices by the expected 
underlying rate of inflation, as in Yun (1996), and to some extent by the difference between the 
past actual and perceived underlying inflation rates, similarly to Christiano et al. (2005). If the 
firm is not allowed to change its price for t periods ahead the updated price will be: 
                                                           𝑃𝑇 𝑖 =  𝑃𝑡 𝑖 Π𝑇,𝑡
𝐼 =  𝑃𝑡 𝑖 Π𝑇
𝐼 Π𝑇−1
𝐼 …Π𝑡
𝐼     (3.35) 
where Π𝑇
𝐼 =  
Π𝑡
Π 𝑡
 
𝜗𝑑  
Π 𝑡+1, Π𝑡 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
, 𝜗𝑑   represents the degree of indexation according to past 
inflation, and Π 𝑡 is the perceived inflation trend. 
If the firm i can to re-optimize its price, then it does so by solving the following 
maximization problem:          (3.36) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝛽𝛾𝑑 
𝑇−𝑡
∞
𝑇=𝑡
 
(ΛT
o )/PT  
(Λt
o)/Pt   
 VT Pt i   
where VT Pt i   is the firm profit, ΛT
o
 is the marginal utility of consumption of optimizing 
consumers. 
From the first order conditions of the problem, we obtain that the re-optimized aggregate price 
can be described by the following recursive form:  
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                                                                          𝒫𝑡 =  
𝜃
𝜃−1
ℒ𝑡
1
ℒ𝑡
2                                                             (3.37) 
where     ℒ𝑡
1 =  Λt
o y
t
mct + 𝛾𝑑  βEt    
Π𝑡+1
Πt
𝐼  
𝜃
ℒ𝑡+1
1                    (3.38) 
                                                      ℒ𝑡
2 = Λt
o y
t
+ 𝛾𝑑  βEt    
Π𝑡+1
Πt
𝐼  
𝜃−1
ℒ𝑡+1
2       (3.39) 
From the definition of the aggregate price index, the law of motion of the aggregate price index 
can be shown to be as:          (3.40) 
𝒫𝑡
1−𝜃 =
1 − 𝛾𝑑  
Π𝑡+1
Πt
𝐼  
𝜃−1
1 − 𝛾𝑑
 
Finally, the log-linear inflation Phillips curve is given by:     (3.41) 
𝜋𝑡 =
 1 − 𝛾𝑑   1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑑  
𝛾𝑑  1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑑 
 𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡
𝑑 +
𝛽
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑑 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 +
𝜗𝑑
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑑 
𝜋𝑡−1  
The exporting firms buy a domestic good and transform it into a differentiated export 
good which is sold on foreign market, which leads to the exporting firms being the sole supplier 
of differentiated goods. The marginal cost of an exporting firm is the price paid for domestic 
good (Pt). The external sector is represented in an ad hoc manner and the demand for export 
goods is given by:          (3.42) 
𝑥𝑡 =  𝑥𝑡−1
𝑕𝑥   1 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑥 𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠−𝜃𝑥𝑠  
where 𝑕𝑥  is the export smooth parameter, 𝜂𝑡
𝑥  is a shock, 𝜃𝑥𝑠  denotes the export price elasticity, 
𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠  is the price index of exported goods denominated in foreign currency 
The exporters set their prices in a similar way as the producers of final goods do and the 
Phillips curve for export price inflation takes the following form:    (3.42) 
𝜋𝑡
𝑥𝑠 =
 1 − 𝛾𝑥  1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑥 
𝛾𝑥 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑥 
 −𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠 − 𝑞𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡
𝑥  +
𝛽
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑥 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
𝑥𝑠 +
𝜗𝑥
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑥 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑥𝑠  
and 𝜋𝑡
𝑥𝑠 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠
𝑃𝑡−1
𝑥𝑠  . 
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3.4 Monetary policy 
The central bank sets nominal interest rates following a Taylor type rule. This simple 
feedback rule assumes that monetary policy responds to inflation, output gap and nominal 
exchange rate:           (3.43) 
1 + 𝑖𝑡 =  1 + 𝑖𝑡−1 
𝜁𝑖 1 + 𝜋𝑡 
𝜁𝜋𝑒𝑡
𝜁𝑒𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡
𝜁𝑔𝑑𝑝  
where 𝜁𝑖  denotes the degree of interest rate smoothing, 𝜁𝜋  is the weight on inflation, 𝜁𝑒  is the 
weight of the nominal exchange rate, 𝜁𝑔𝑑𝑝   denotes the weight of the GDP and e represent the 
nominal exchange rate. 
 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡 −  
1 + 𝑖𝑡
1 + 𝜋𝑡
− 1 𝑏𝑡−1 
3.5 Fiscal policy 
In the model of Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010), the government budget constraint is given 
by:            (3.44) 
𝜏𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡
𝑙 + 𝜏𝑡
𝑠 𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝑜𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡 −  
1 + 𝑖𝑡
1 + 𝜋𝑡
 𝑏𝑡−1 
In order to match the data series to model I defined some extra variables as follows. I 
considered that the budget revenues are obtained collecting VAT, income tax and social 
contributions paid by employees and employers but also by collecting a lump sum tax: 
                                            𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑜𝑡𝑡          (3.45) 
where    𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡
𝑐𝑐𝑡 ,  𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡
𝑙𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡 ,  𝑠𝑐𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡
𝑠𝑤𝑡𝐿𝑡  and 𝑜𝑡𝑡  is a first order autoregressive 
process: 𝑜𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑜𝑡𝑡  
The government has two types of discretionary expenditures: it provides financial 
transfers to the non-ricardian consumers and purchases goods and services from the private 
sector:            (3.45) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝑜𝑒𝑡 
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where 𝑜𝑒𝑡  (other expenditure) is a first order autoregressive process: 𝑜𝑒𝑡 = 𝜌𝑜𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑜𝑒𝑡  
The primary balance of the budget is the difference between revenues and expenditure: 
     𝑝𝑠𝑡 = 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡          (3.46) 
The fiscal deficit and the real flow budget constraint for the fiscal authority are defined as: 
                                                              𝑡𝑡 =  𝑝𝑠𝑡 +  
1+𝑖𝑡
1+𝜋𝑡
− 1 𝑏𝑡−1            (3.47) 
where 𝑏𝑡  represent the government debt (government bonds in real term) calculated as 
accumulated deficits:           (3.48) 
𝑏𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝑡𝑡  
Although there are many studies on the subject, these don‟t yield a consensus regarding 
the formulation of fiscal rules. The budget constraint itself represents a fiscal rule. There are five 
fiscal policy instruments and for each one, we need to define a fiscal rule designed to ensure the 
fiscal solvency in the model, such that government deficit to be covered by future taxes in order 
to satisfy the government budget constraint.  
According to these rules, fiscal authority reacts to past deficits and to current output in 
order to fulfill its stabilizing role (or simply letting the automatic stabilizers work). Thus, fiscal 
policy tries to stabilize the deficits and consequently the debt level. 
Tax rates
4
 are modeled to allow a positive response to an increase in deficit to output ratio (the 
circumflexes above variables denote log-deviations from steady state):    (3.49) 
𝜏 𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜌𝜏
𝑖
𝜏 𝑡−1
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜌𝜏
𝑖
  𝑓
𝜏 𝑖
𝑔
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 −𝑓𝜏 𝑖
𝑡 𝑡 𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖  
where i={c, s, l}, 𝜌𝜏
𝑖
denotes the degree of tax rate smoothing, 𝑓
𝜏 𝑖
𝑔
, 𝑓
𝜏 𝑖
𝑡  are reaction parameters. 
The government expenditure and financial transfers are assumed to follow a rule that negatively 
respond to an increase in deficit to output ratio:      (3.50) 
                                                             
4
 These tax rates can be considered as effective tax rates 
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𝜒 𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜌𝜒
𝑖
𝜒 𝑡−1
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜌𝜒
𝑖
  −𝑓
𝜒 𝑖
𝑔
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝑓𝜒 𝑖
𝑡 𝑡 𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖  
where χ={G, TR}, 𝜌𝜒
𝑖
denotes the degree of expenditure item smoothing, 𝑓
𝜒 𝑖
𝑔
,𝑓
𝜒 𝑖
𝑡 are reaction 
parameters. 
3.6 Equilibrium conditions 
At equilibrium, all markets clear, the demand of goods is equal with the supply. The 
goods market equilibrium condition follows from aggregating the individual budget constraints: 
   𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑥𝑡 +  𝛹 𝑢𝑡 𝑗  𝑘𝑡−1 𝑗                (3.51) 
where 𝑐𝑡 is the aggregated consumption of the two types of consumers, 𝛹 𝑢𝑡 𝑗  𝑘𝑡−1 𝑗  is the 
volume of capital not used in production and 𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑥 is the dispersion of export prices. 
In order to determine the total GDP of the economy, it still needs to be adjusted by the 
export revenues, import expenses (calculated in domestic currency) and the expenses used for 
export production:          (3.52) 
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠𝑥𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠𝑚𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡  
Economic agents may accumulate debts against foreign partners, so net foreign assets‟ 
market clears when the net position of export/import firms equals domestic investment in foreign 
bonds. The evolution of net foreign assets (measured in foreign currency) is given by: 
             𝑏𝑡
𝑠 =  1 + 𝑖𝑡−1
∗  𝑏𝑡−1
𝑠 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠𝑥𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠𝑚𝑡         (3.53) 
In order to ensure stationary equilibrium we assume that foreign interest rate depends on the 
financial premium shock 𝜂𝑝𝑟  and on the NFA position that increases with the country‟s net 
foreign asset position as in Schmitt-Grohé-Uribe (2002): 
       1 + 𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑒−𝜐 𝑏𝑡−𝑏  1 + 𝜂𝑝𝑟           (3.54) 
Nominal exchange rate is determined by the uncovered interest rate parity: 
                                                                       
1+𝑖𝑡
1+𝑖𝑡
∗ =
𝑒𝑡+1
𝑒𝑡
        (3.55) 
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Unfortunately there are no data available for worked hours in Romania. Adolfson et al. 
(2005) does not have an observable series of worked hours for the Euro area, so he models the 
employment using Calvo rigidity. He assumes that only a fraction of the firms can adjust the 
level of employment to the preferred amount of total labor input while the rest of the firms keep 
employment from the last period. The following equation links the employment to labor supplied 
by households:          (3.56) 
Δn t = βEt Δn t+1 +
 1 − 𝛾𝑛  1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑛 
𝛾𝑛
 𝐿 𝑡 − 𝑛 𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑡
𝑛  
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4. Estimation  
4.1 Estimation procedure 
In this section I introduce some basic information about Bayesian estimation. This 
method can be defined as a bridge between calibration and maximum likelihood. The priors are 
weights on the likelihood function in order to give more importance to certain areas of the 
parameter subspace. 
The posterior distribution is linked with the prior and likelihood function by Bayes‟ rule 
(see Annex II) as follows: 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗  𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
The model estimation was performed using DYNARE toolbox with MATLAB R2010a. 
Dynare put the model in a state-space form and use the Kalmann filter to find the log-likelihood 
function 𝑙𝑛 𝐿(𝜃|𝑌𝑇
∗), where 𝜃 is a vector of parameters and  𝑌𝑇
∗ is the set of observable variables. 
Then, using the specified priors and the likelihood function, Dynare compute the log posterior 
kernel (the posterior density function of parameters): 
𝑙𝑛 𝐾 𝜃 𝑌𝑇
∗ = 𝑙𝑛 𝐿 𝜃 𝑌𝑇
∗ + 𝑙𝑛 𝑝(𝜃) 
In the next step, the log posterior kernel is maximized using a numerical optimization routine and 
is calculated the mode of the posterior density function; then, the posterior kernel is simulated 
using a sampling-like or Monte Carlo method such as the Metropolis-Hastings, a ”rejection 
sampling algorithm” which generates a sequence of samples (Markov Chains) from a distribution 
that is unknown. 
The posterior distribution was simulated using two MH chains with 100,000 draws each 
and scale parameter of 0.35 that imply an acceptation rate of 23%. The convergence of MH 
algorithm was checked using the method of Brooks & Gelman (1998). 
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4.2. Data 
The model parameters were estimated using quarterly data of the Romanian economy 
which cover the period of 2000:Q1 - 2011:Q4. Unfortunately, Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010) 
does not specify in their article what data series used in estimation, so I followed Iwata (2009) 
and Kliem (2011) to match the data to model. Iwata (2009) considered that the tax rates “can be 
appropriately approximated by the aggregate effective tax rates, which are computed using 
macroeconomic data, such as national accounts and revenue statistics”. For Romanian economy 
it is difficult to calculate these effective tax rates, so I chose to use as observable series the 
amounts collected under these taxes. 
The set of eighteen variables, considered as observables, includes: 
- Ordinary series used in literature: GDP, households‟ consumption, investment, export, import, 
wage. These data are real, seasonally adjusted, logged and detrended with HP filter. 
- Fiscal data as: public debt, budget revenues, budget expenditure, VAT, personal income tax, 
Social contributions paid by employees and employers, transfers and government consumption. 
Also, these data are real, seasonally adjusted, logged and de-trend with HP filter. 
- Employment, nominal interest rate and CPI. These data are seasonally adjusted, logged and de-
trend with HP filter. 
The data sources and other explanations can be found in Annex III. 
4.3. Calibrated parameters 
Some parameters were difficult to identify due to weak identification and small sample, 
so those were kept fixed in the estimation procedure; these coefficients can be considered as a 
very strict prior. Also, some parameters are directly related to the steady state values of 
endogenous variables. 
 Unfortunately, there is a lack of relevant studies for Romanian economy on this field, so 
the parameters were calibrated using values common to the business cycle literature.  
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The discount factor β was set at 0.97 (that implies a quarterly interest steady state 
nominal interest rate of 3%) and the depreciation rate δ was set to be 3% per quarter. Following 
the paper of Stork (2011) (this model was created for Czech Republic economy), the inter-
temporal elasticity of consumption σ was set at 2 and the inter-temporal elasticity of labor ϕ was 
set to 5. The substitution elasticity between labor and imports, 𝜌𝑧  is assumed to be 0.8 according 
to Jakab (2010), while substitution elasticity between capital and composite input 𝜌 is set equal 
to 1.05. Also, the fix cost of production was set equal to 0.25 and the debt elasticity of financial 
premium is equal to 0.01, as in Schmitt-Grohé-Uribe (2002). The remaining parameters from 
Table1 were set matching values used by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010): 
Table 1:         Calibrated parameters value 
β discount factor 0.97 
δ depreciation rate 0.03 
σ Intertemporal elasticity of 
consumption 
2 
ϕ intertemporal elasticity of labor 5 
ϖ share of ricardian households 0.75 
ρ elasticity of substitution between 
capital and composite input 
1.05 
 
 
elasticity of substitution between 
labor and imports 
0.8 
fix fix cost 0.25 
 
home price elasticity 6 
 
elasticity of labor 3 
 investment adjustment cost 13 
 
parameter of capital utilization 0.2 
 
labor input adjustment cost 3 
 import input adjustment cost 3 
𝝊 debt elasticity of financial premium 0.01 
 
The steady state variables (the steady state shares) are calibrated using averages over the 
sample period 2000q1-2011q4, while the steady state values of taxation rates were set at their 
current levels: 
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Table 2. Steady state: values 
 
VAT 0.24 
 
Labor tax rate+social contribution tax rate (paid 
by employees) 
0.325 
 
Social contribution tax rate (paid by employers) 0.315 
D/GDP Ratio of debt to GDP -0.2686 
T/GDP Ratio of deficit to GDP -0.0358 
G/GDP Share of gov. consum. to GDP 0.171 
C/GDP Share of households consumption to GDP 0.67 
m/GDP Share of imports to GDP 0.4292 
x/GDP Share of exports to GDP 0.3457 
tr/GDP Ratio of transfers to GDP 0.13 
rev/gdp Ratio of budgetary revenues to GDP 0.341 
expn/gdp Ratio of budgetary expenditure to GDP 0.3768 
pit/gdp Ratio of Pit to GDP 0.066 
vat/gdp Ratio of vat to GDP 0.075 
sc/gdp Ratio of social contributions to GDP 0.068 
oe/gdp Ratio of other expenditure to GDP 0.0758 
i_ss Nominal interest rate 0.0309 
rk_ss Rental fee 0.0609 
a Share of labor used in production 0.2987 
α Share of capital used in production 0.3929 
Source: author’s own calculation 
The steady state values of those parameters implies a share of labor used in production of 
0.2987 and a share of capital of 0.3929. 
4.4. Prior distributions 
The remaining parameters were estimated, and for each one there was a prior distribution 
defined. The prior distributions were selected in line with the four common distributions used in 
literature: Normal distribution for sign unrestricted parameters, Beta distribution for parameters 
between 0 and 1, Gamma and Inverse-Gamma distribution for parameters restricted to be always 
positive. 
For habit consumption hc , I selected a beta distribution with mean 0.7 and a standard 
error of 0.05, while for export smooth parameter hx , I chose a Beta distribution with mean 0.8 (in 
by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010) it was 0.75) and a standard error of 0.01. 
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For Calvo parameters in domestic and export price setting equations (𝛾𝑑  and 𝛾𝑥 ), I 
selected a Beta distribution with mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.03, while for Calvo 
parameter in wage price setting equation (𝛾𝑤 ), I chose a mean of 0.7. Thus, I assumed that prices 
adjust every 2 quarters, while the length of work contract is about one year. 
Following Zubairy (2009), for autoregressive parameters in shock processes, I selected 
Beta distributions with mean of 0.7 and standard deviation of 0.05. 
For parameters of the monetary policy rule, I chose the standard values proposed by 
Taylor: 1.5 for the inflation coefficient 𝜁𝜋 , 0.5 for GDP coefficient 𝜁𝑔𝑑𝑝  and the standard 
deviation were set at 0.05. For interest rate smoothing 𝜁𝑖 , I chose a Beta distribution with mean 
0.7 and standard deviation of 0.5. 
There were defined fiscal rules for labor tax rate, VAT, social contribution tax rate, 
transfers and government spending. According to these rules, fiscal authority reacts to past 
deficits and to current output in order to fulfill its stabilizing role (or simply letting the automatic 
stabilizers work). 
Regarding the fiscal rule parameters, there is a lack of consensus in choosing the prior 
means. I considered that the coeficients (which can be interpreted as elasticities) that capture the 
response to government deficit are Inverse-Gamma distributed with mean 0.05 and standard 
deviation of 0.1, just as in Baksa, Benk and Jakab. This is because the Inverse-Gamma 
distribution allows a positive respond to an increase in deficit to output ratio in order to ensure 
fiscal solvency. 
Kliem and Kriwoluzky (2010) argue in their paper that “the choice of the Inverse-Gamma 
distribution is motivated by the estimation results of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) which suggest 
a positive elasticity between tax revenues and output implying also a positive elasticity of the 
total households' average tax rate with output. But, this does not imply that each tax instrument 
faces a positive elasticity with output.” Following this approach, I deviated from the standard 
prior choice and selected a normal distribution for these parameters with mean 0 and standard 
deviation of 0.2. 
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4.5. Estimation results 
The model estimation was performed using DYNARE toolbox with MATLAB R2010a. I 
used two parallel MH chains of 100000 replications each and I kept 20000 draws to build the 
posterior distributions. The graphs of prior distributions, posterior distributions and mode are 
reported in the Annex IV. These graphs indicate that the posterior distributions are well 
approximated around the posterior mode. The prior and posterior density graphs differ and the 
data series used in estimation are informative. The following table summarizes prior 
distributions, posterior means, and 90% credible intervals (or Bayesian confidence intervals) of 
the parameters: 
Table 3: 
Simbol Description Prior 
distributi
on 
Mean Stand
ard 
error 
Posteri
or 
mean 
Conf. Interval 
Utility function parameters      
𝒉𝒄 habit formation beta 0.7 0.05 0.8803 0.849 0.9118 
Prices and wage settings parameters 
𝜸𝒙 Calvo export prices beta 0.5 0.03 0.4935 0.4439 0.5462 
𝜸𝒘 Calvo wages beta 0.7 0.01 0.6763 0.6608 0.6924 
𝜸𝒅 Calvo domestic prices beta 0.5 0.03 0.5112 0.4961 0.5289 
𝜸𝒏 Calvo employment beta 0.5 0.03 0.4211 0.3735 0.4705 
𝝑𝒘 indexation rate wages beta 0.5 0.1 0.1173 0.0714 0.1666 
𝝑𝒙 indexation rate export prices beta 0.5 0.1 0.4965 0.4086 0.5894 
𝝑𝒅 indexation rate domestic prices beta 0.5 0.1 0.5775 0.5016 0.6626 
Interest rate coefficients 
𝜻_𝒊 interest smooth norm 0.7 0.05 0.4944 0.4342 0.5531 
𝜻𝝅 inflation policy rule norm 1.5 0.05 1.3795 1.2974 1.4561 
𝜻𝒆 exchange rate norm 0.01 0.01 0.0017 0 0.0035 
𝜻𝒈𝒅𝒑 GDP norm 0.5 0.05 0.6092 0.5348 0.6854 
Inflation learning 
𝝆𝝅 trend inflation persistence beta 0.9 0.05 0.7994 0.6936 0.9064 
𝒈 Gain beta 0.2 0.05 0.0596 0.0312 0.0868 
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Export      
𝒉𝒙 export smoothing beta 0.8 0.01 0.8074 0.7903 0.8231 
𝜽𝒙𝒔 Elasticity beta 0.3 0.05 0.3627 0.3159 0.4098 
Autoregressive parameters 
𝝆𝑷𝒎𝒔  inport prices beta 0.7 0.05 0.7235 0.6229 0.8107 
𝝆𝒙𝒔 export demand beta 0.7 0.05 0.7317 0.6438 0.815 
𝝆𝒂 productivity beta 0.7 0.05 0.691 0.6036 0.7733 
𝝆𝒑𝒓 financial premium beta 0.7 0.05 0.5097 0.4453 0.5772 
𝝆𝒓 Interest beta 0.7 0.05 0.5528 0.4776 0.632 
𝝆𝑻𝒐𝒃 Tobin factor beta 0.7 0.05 0.5741 0.5133 0.6341 
𝝆𝒄 consumption preference beta 0.7 0.05 0.68 0.5983 0.7591 
𝝆𝒗𝒘 Wage beta 0.7 0.05 0.7099 0.626 0.7925 
𝝆𝒗𝒙 export  beta 0.7 0.05 0.6934 0.6119 0.7741 
𝝆𝒗𝒅 domestic price beta 0.7 0.05 0.656 0.5784 0.7383 
𝝆𝑰𝒏𝒗 investments beta 0.7 0.05 0.9041 0.877 0.9327 
Autoregressive parameters of fiscal elements 
𝝆𝝉𝒄 VAT beta 0.7 0.05 0.6975 0.6161 0.78 
𝝆𝝉𝒍 PIT beta 0.7 0.05 0.6946 0.6157 0.7776 
𝝆𝝉𝒔 SC beta 0.7 0.05 0.6965 0.6194 0.7805 
𝝆𝒈 government expenditure beta 0.7 0.05 0.6965 0.6073 0.7804 
𝝆𝒕𝒓 Transfers beta 0.7 0.05 0.7008 0.6272 0.7819 
𝝆𝒐𝒕 Lump sum tax beta 0.7 0.05 0.6942 0.6049 0.7753 
𝝆𝒐𝒆 other expenditures beta 0.7 0.05 0.692 0.6062 0.7695 
Reaction function parameters 
𝒇𝝉𝒄
𝒕
 VAT to deficit invg 0.05 0.1 0.0526 0.0143 0.0996 
𝒇𝝉𝒄
𝒈
 VAT to GDP norm 0 0.2 0.0302 -0.2877 0.3518 
𝒇
𝝉𝒍
𝒕
 PIT to deficit invg 0.05 0.1 0.0402 0.012 0.0721 
𝒇
𝝉𝒍
𝒈
 PIT to GDP norm 0 0.2 -0.0053 -0.3171 0.3039 
𝒇𝝉𝒔
𝒕  SC to deficit invg 0.05 0.1 0.0364 0.0143 0.058 
𝒇𝝉𝒔
𝒈
 SC to GDP norm 0 0.2 -0.0132 -0.3535 0.3386 
𝒇𝒓𝒕
𝒕  TR to deficit invg 0.05 0.1 0.036 0.0131 0.0572 
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𝒇𝒕𝒓
𝒈
 TR to GDP norm 0 0.2 -0.0015 -0.3262 0.3234 
𝒇𝒈
𝒕  G to deficit invg 0.05 0.1 0.0328 0.0139 0.0508 
𝒇𝒈
𝒈
 G to GDP norm 0 0.2 -0.0998 -0.4052 0.2199 
Source: author’s own calculation 
The estimated posterior mean for habit consumption 𝑕𝑐  is 0.8884 even if the mean of the 
prior was set to 0.7. This result indicates that the degree of deep habit in private consumption is 
high, the current level of consumption being influenced by the previous consumption level. Thus, 
for households their standard of living is very important.  
 The Calvo parameter for sticky wages 𝛾𝑤  is estimated at 0.6752 and this implies that 
wages can be negotiated in an optimal way once every three quarters.  
According with estimated value for price stickiness, domestic prices are set in an optimal 
way once every three quarters and export prices adjustment takes place every two ones. Thus, the 
export prices seem to be more flexible than domestic prices. 
The domestic price indexation parameter is estimated at 0.794, indicating that the weight 
on lagged inflation from Phillips price curve 
𝜗𝑑
 1+𝛽𝜗𝑑  
 is 0.44, while the export price indexation 
parameter implies a weight 
𝜗𝑥
 1+𝛽𝜗𝑥 
  approximated at only 0.33. The posterior mean of wage 
indexation parameter is 0.1737, implying that the weight on lagged wage inflation from wage 
setting equation,  
𝜗𝑤
 1+𝛽𝜗𝑤  
 is only 0.1486. Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010) argue that the indexation 
parameters should be interpreted with caution because the indexation formulas imply that “both 
prices and wages are fully indexed to the perceived long-run component of inflation”. Parameters 
𝜗𝑑  and 𝜗𝑤  represent “the degree of additional indexation to the cyclical components of past price 
and wage inflation rates”. 
The estimated parameters for monetary policy rule have the expected signs and almost 
satisfy the Taylor principle: the response to inflation 𝜁𝜋  is 1.39 while the response to output 𝜁𝑔𝑑𝑝  
is 0.61 but the degree of interest rate smoothing is relatively low, 0.49. Thus, the model shows 
that interest rate responds stronger to inflation than to output gap. Also the exchange rate 
30 
 
parameter 𝜁𝑒  has the expected sign, but statistically it seems not to be significantly different from 
zero. 
In this model, the agents are able to learn inflation trend gradually applying an adaptive 
algorithm. The perceived trend of inflation depends on the current deviation of inflation trend 
and on the previous period inflation trend. The estimated value for learning speed parameter 𝑔 is 
much lower than prior mean (0.06) and the trend inflation persistence𝜌𝜋   is estimated to be 0.8.  
Almost all the autoregressive parameters of shocks range from 0.6 to 0.75 and are 
relatively close to specified prior means, indicating a high persistence of shocks in economy over 
time.  
The estimated fiscal response coefficients to deficit level are significant. According to 
estimated parameters, the most responsive one to budget deficit seems to be the VAT rate ( 
𝑓𝜏𝑐
𝑡 =0.0526), followed by personal income tax rate (𝑓
𝜏 𝑙
𝑔
=0.04); both government spending and 
transfers respond almost equal to deficit level.  
These results are somewhat reliable, given recent measures taken by Romanian 
authorities in order to adjust the budgetary deficit accumulated until the end of 2009 (9% 
according to ESA95 methodology, 7.4% in cash basis). The Government decided in 2010 to 
implement a fiscal consolidation plan, mainly based on increase of VAT rate by 5 percentage 
points (from 19 per cent to 24 per cent) and on the temporary cut of public sector wages by 25%. 
Also, the level of social assistance expenditure was decreased, as well as the level of goods and 
services expenditure. Compared to previous year, the level of deficit decreased at 7.1% 
according to ESA95 standard (6.5% following cash methodology). The consolidation process 
was continued in 2011, and as a result the budget deficit decreased at 4.12% in cash basis.  
In conclusion, our results suggest that taxation of consumption and labor played an 
important role in stabilizing the fiscal deficit during the sample period. 
 The estimated fiscal response parameters to output gap seem to indicate a pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy, the automatic stabilizers being too weak or insufficient to stabilize the economy. 
On the expenditure side, the government spending reacts negatively to a change in output gap 
with a high degree of persistence (-0.1), while the transfers coefficient is not reliably different 
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from zero. These results are similar with those obtained by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010) for 
Hungarian economy. 
On the revenue side, the response of social contributions rate paid by employers is also negative, 
reflecting the high correlation between firms‟ activity and macroeconomic framework. The 
estimated coefficient of personal income tax rate seems to be not reliably different from zero; 
this result is somewhat explained through the lack of progressivity of wage taxes. The VAT rate 
is the only parameter relevant for fiscal policy stabilization. 
Again, these results are not surprising because in the pre-crisis period the Romanian 
fiscal policy was pro-cyclical with badly consequences for the sustainability of public finances. 
The following graph show that the fiscal impulse was positive before 2008-2009 and contributed 
to overheating of the economy: 
Figure 1: Fiscal impulse, structural deficit and excess demand. 
 
Source: The Fiscal Council of Romania, Annual report 2011. 
The pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy was maintained during the crisis due to the lack of fiscal 
space needed to stimulate the economy. 
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5. Irf interpretation 
Using the estimated model, I tried to present in this section the macroeconomic variables‟ 
reactions to fiscal policy shocks. Impulse response functions are calculated as reactions of the 
endogenous variable to 1 percent increase in innovation in the initial period. The x-axis indicates 
quarters after the shock hits the economy and the y axis shows the variables‟ percentage 
deviation from their steady state.  
The following figure shows the impulse response functions to a shock in VAT rate. 
Figure 2: Impulse response functions to a one percent increase in the VAT rate. 
 
Source: author’s own calculation 
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Note: I – investments; c – total consumption; c_o – the consumption of ricardian type households; c_no – the 
consumption of liquidity constrained households; i – nominal interest rate;  pi_hat – inflation; n – employment; w – 
wage; l – labor; z – intermediate good; m – import; q, e – real/nominal interest rate; y – final good; x – export, tva 
– VAT revenue; pit – PIT revenue; sc – social contribution revenue; tr – transfers; eta_g – government spending; 
rev – budgetary revenues; expn – budgetary expenditures; PS – primary balance; T_GDP – the deficit ratio to 
GDP; 
For an increase in VAT rate, the consumption declines mainly due to a sharply fall in 
consumption of liquidity constrained households. The degree of habit formation is high, so the 
consumption of Ricardian type households remains almost unchanged.  
As a result of consumption decline, the demand for goods decreases, as well as GDP, 
while the responses of interest, inflation, labor and investments are insignificant. 
Figure 3 shows that as a response to a shock in the PIT rate (including social contribution 
paid by employees and personal income tax rate), consumption and output decrease on the short-
run. The consumption of non-optimizers households decreases sharply while the consumption of 
ricardian type households remains almost unchanged, indicating a high degree of habit 
formation.  One can observe a small shift of demand from consumption to investment goods, but 
this is also insignificant. 
Surprisingly, an increase in labor tax rate also causes an increase in wages and this can be 
explained due to efforts to renegotiate work contracts.  
The responses of interest, inflation, labor and investments are insignificant. At the same time, the 
production of intermediate and final goods appears to be unaffected by this shock. 
The VAT revenue decreases due to consumption fall; also the revenue from personal income tax 
increases, contributing to a budget surplus accumulation. 
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a one percent increase in the PIT rate. 
 
Source: author’s own calculation 
Note: I – investments; c – total consumption; c_o – the consumption of ricardian type households; c_no – the 
consumption of liquidity constrained households; i – nominal interest rate;  pi_hat – inflation; n – employment; w – 
wage; l – labor; z – intermediate good; m – import; q, e – real/nominal interest rate; y – final good; x – export, tva 
– VAT revenue; pit – PIT revenue; sc – social contribution revenue; tr – transfers; eta_g – government spending; 
rev – budgetary revenues; expn – budgetary expenditures; PS – primary balance; T_GDP – the deficit ratio to 
GDP; 
The impulse response functions to a one percent increase of social contribution rate (paid 
by employer) can be seen in Figure 4. This shock has some implications in firms‟ economic 
activity. First of all, firms try to minimize their costs, so wages fall on impact and then slowly 
rise at steady-state value; secondly, labor demand decreases as well as employment. Thirdly, 
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producers will try to maintain the same profit rate, so they will increase prices and, as a result, 
the interest rate will increase.  
Again, the consumption of ricardian type households remains almost unchanged and the 
total consumption is insignificantly influenced even if the consumption of non-optimizers agents 
decreases. Thus, the demand for goods and services remains approximately the same. Compared 
to a shock in PIT rate, the response of GDP is not statistically significant from zero. 
The revenue from social contribution increases, but the revenue from VAT decreases 
(due to non-optimizers households‟ consumption decrease) as well as PIT revenue (due to wages 
decrease). 
Figure 4: Impulse response functions to a one percent increase in the Social Contrib. rate. 
 
Source: author’s own calculation 
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Note: I – investments; c – total consumption; c_o – the consumption of ricardian type households; c_no – the 
consumption of liquidity constrained households; i – nominal interest rate;  pi_hat – inflation; n – employment; w – 
wage; l – labor; z – intermediate good; m – import; q, e – real/nominal interest rate; y – final good; x – export, tva 
– VAT revenue; pit – PIT revenue; sc – social contribution revenue; tr – transfers; eta_g – government spending; 
rev – budgetary revenues; expn – budgetary expenditures; PS – primary balance; T_GDP – the deficit ratio to 
GDP; 
 
 
In Figure 5 we present the responses to an increase in transfers. Increasing transfers has a 
strongly positive effect on non-optimizers households‟ consumption. The consumption of 
ricardian type consumers declines, but the total consumption rise.  
Regarding the wages‟ dynamics, Iwata (2009) argues that their path is a sum of two 
effects: “both price stickiness and inclusion of non-Ricardian households induce a real wage 
increase after a government spending shock, whereas wage stickiness and distortionary taxation 
reduce the wage increase”. Also, he argues that “real wages decline after a government spending 
shock, in order to meet labor supply increase in basic neoclassical models.” In conclusion, the 
increase of wages can be explained by wage stickiness and distortionary taxation. 
After an increase in transfers, one can see strong crowding out effects on investments. 
Also, the supply of final and intermediate goods increases as well as output. 
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a one percent increase in transfers. 
 
Source: author’s own calculation 
Note: I – investments; c – total consumption; c_o – the consumption of ricardian type households; c_no – the 
consumption of liquidity constrained households; i – nominal interest rate;  pi_hat – inflation; n – employment; w – 
wage; l – labor; z – intermediate good; m – import; q, e – real/nominal interest rate; y – final good; x – export, tva 
– VAT revenue; pit – PIT revenue; sc – social contribution revenue; tr – transfers; eta_g – government spending; 
rev – budgetary revenues; expn – budgetary expenditures; PS – primary balance; T_GDP – the deficit ratio to 
GDP; 
Figure 6 shows the impulse response functions to a shock in government spending. The 
model is not in agreement with specific literature (for example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002)) 
which argues a positive effect on consumption and wages at an increase in government 
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expenditures. Even so, one can identify a weakly Keynesian multiplier effect on non-optimizers‟ 
consumption. 
 
Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a one percent increase in government spending. 
 
Source: author’s own calculation 
Note: I – investments; c – total consumption; c_o – the consumption of ricardian type households; c_no – the 
consumption of liquidity constrained households; i – nominal interest rate;  pi_hat – inflation; n – employment; w – 
wage; l – labor; z – intermediate good; m – import; q, e – real/nominal interest rate; y – final good; x – export, tva 
– VAT revenue; pit – PIT revenue; sc – social contribution revenue; tr – transfers; eta_g – government spending; 
rev – budgetary revenues; expn – budgetary expenditures; PS – primary balance; T_GDP – the deficit ratio to 
GDP; 
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But, in the short run the decrease in optimizers‟ consumption offsets the increase in non-
optimizers‟ consumption. Thus, after an increase in government spending, we can see strong 
crowding out effects on private consumption and investment. The government‟s spending is 
financed by a rise in taxes and this affects the marginal return on labor causing a decrease of 
after tax wages. Thus, according with Iwata (2009), these kinds of shocks “generate a negative 
wealth effect, which induces households to increase the labor supply and to decrease 
consumption”. 
Government demand offsets the decline of private demand and, as a result, the supply of 
final and intermediate goods increases, as well as output, inflation rate and interest rise and also 
the level of budgetary deficit grow sharply. 
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6. Conclusions 
In this paper,I used and adjusted the model created by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010) for 
the Hungarian economy according to the specific features of the Romanian economy. This model 
is an extended version of the DSGE model presented by Smets and Wouters (2003) and it 
incorporates rigidities like: habit formation, investment adjustment cost, capital utilization rate, 
price and wage settings as in Calvo (1983), indexation mechanisms in prices and wages. Baksa, 
Benk and Jakab extended the model of Smets and Wouters (2003) mainly by introducing a more 
developed fiscal policy block, designed to capture the shocks coming from fiscal policy 
decisions. Also, for each item of revenue and expenditure, a fiscal rule was implemented (a fiscal 
reaction function). 
My contributions towards developing Baksa, Benk and Jakab‟s model even further can be 
summed up in the following three actions. First of all, I estimated the model for the Romanian 
economy, using Bayesian techniques. Secondly, I determined the parameters of fiscal feedback 
rules in order to establish if the automatic stabilizers work properly. And thirdly, I tried to 
analyze the impulse response functions in order to assess the effects of different fiscal policy 
measures on the most important macroeconomic variables.  
My main findings can be summarized as follow:  
The degree of deep habit in private consumption is high, the current level of consumption 
being influenced by the previous consumption level. Thus, for households, their standard of 
living is very important.  
The Calvo parameter for sticky wages implies that wages can be negotiated in an optimal 
way once every three quarters. Also, according with the estimated value for price stickiness, 
domestic prices are set in an optimal way once every three quarters and export prices adjustment 
takes place every two ones. These results are consistent with the empirical findings from other 
studies. 
The estimated parameters for monetary policy rule have the expected signs and almost 
satisfy the Taylor principle. 
41 
 
My results suggest that taxation of consumption and labor played an important role in 
stabilizing the fiscal deficit during the sample period. According to estimated parameters, the 
most responsive one to budget deficit seems to be the VAT rate, followed by personal income 
tax rate. These results are somewhat reliable, given recent measures taken by Romanian 
authorities in order to adjust the budgetary deficit accumulated until the end of 2009.  
The estimated fiscal response parameters to output gap seem to indicate a pro-cyclical 
fiscal policy, the automatic stabilizers being too weak or insufficient to stabilize the economy. 
On the expenditure side, the government spending reacts negatively to a change in output gap 
with a high degree of persistence (-0.1), while the transfers coefficient is not reliably different 
from zero. These results are similar with those obtained by Baksa, Benk and Jakab (2010) for 
Hungarian economy. On the revenue side, the response of social contributions rate paid by 
employers is also negative, reflecting the high correlation between firms‟ activity and 
macroeconomic framework. Again, these results are not surprising because in the pre-crisis 
period, the Romanian fiscal policy was pro-cyclical with bad consequences for the sustainability 
of public finances. 
Regarding the analyses of IRF, some important conclusions can be formulated. First of 
all, a shock in VAT rate has negative effects on total consumption, mainly due to a sharply fall in 
consumption of liquidity constrained households. Secondly, the degree of habit formation is 
high, so the consumption of Ricardian type households remains almost unchanged. Surprisingly, 
an increase in labor tax rate also causes an increase in wages and this can be explained due to 
efforts to renegotiate work contracts.  
Also, the shocks in social contribution rate (paid by employer) have some implications in 
firms‟ economic activity. First of all, firms try to minimize their costs, so wages fall on impact 
and then slowly rise at steady-state value; secondly, labor demand decreases as well as 
employment. Thirdly, producers will try to maintain the same profit rate, so they will increase 
prices and, as a result, the interest rate will increase.  
Increasing transfers has a strongly positive effect on non-optimizers households‟ 
consumption. After an increase in transfers, one can see strong crowding out effects on 
investments. Also, the model is not in agreement with specific literature (for example, Blanchard 
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and Perotti (2002)) which argues a positive effect on consumption and wages as a result of an 
increase in government expenditures. Even so, one can identify a weakly Keynesian multiplier 
effect on non-optimizers‟ consumption. 
This paper is a small step toward estimating the fiscal policy behavior based on a DSGE 
model that uses quarterly fiscal data. But some issues remain that should be pursued. The fiscal 
policy block should provide a better disaggregation on the fiscal expenditure side (including 
some components like public investment, public purchases of goods and services or public sector 
wage bill). As further work, my estimated model could serve in variance decomposition analysis 
and also, the model can be used in forecasting observable variables. 
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Annexes 
Annex I: The loglinearized equations around their steady state. 
Source: author’s own calculation 
1. Accumulation of capital 
𝑘𝑡 =  1 − 𝛿 𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐼; 
2. Euler equation  
𝑐𝑡
𝑜 =  
1 − 𝑕𝑐
𝜍 1 + 𝑕𝑐 
 ∗  𝜂𝑐 − 𝜂𝑐 𝑡+1  +  
𝑕𝑐
1 + 𝑕𝑐
 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑜  +  
1
1 + 𝑕𝑐
 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑜  +  
1 − 𝑕𝑐
𝜍 1 + 𝑕𝑐 
 
∗  𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝑖𝑡 +  
1 − 𝑕𝑐
𝜍 1 + 𝑕𝑐 
  
𝜏𝑐𝑠𝑠
1 + 𝜏𝑐𝑠𝑠
  𝜏𝑡+1
𝑐 − 𝜏𝑡
𝑐 ; 
3. Tobin-Q  
𝑄𝑡 = −𝜙𝐼𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝐼 1 + 𝛽 𝐼𝑡 − 𝛽𝜙𝐼𝐼𝑡+1 + 𝜙𝐼 𝜂𝑡
𝐼 − 𝜂𝑡+1
𝐼  ; 
4. No-arbitrage condition  
𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑄𝑡 =  
1
1 − 𝛿 + 𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑠
   1 − 𝛿 𝑄𝑡+1 + 𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑡+1
𝑘 + 𝜂𝑇𝑜𝑏  ; 
5. Definition of rental fee  
𝑟𝑡
𝑘 =  
1
𝜓
 𝑢𝑡 ; 
6. Constraint of non-optimizers  
𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑐
1 + 𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑐 𝜏𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑐𝑡
𝑛𝑜 =  
1
 1 + 𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑐  𝑐𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑜    1 − 𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑙  𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑠𝑠 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡 − 𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑙 𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑠𝑠𝜏𝑡
𝑙 +  
𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠
1 −𝜛
 𝑡𝑟𝑡 ; 
7. Aggregate labour supply, New Keynesian Phillips Curve by nominal wage rigidity  
𝜋𝑡
𝑤 =
 1 − 𝛾𝑤   1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑤  
𝛾𝑤 1 + 𝜃𝑤𝜑  1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑤 
 𝜑𝐿𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑙 +
𝜍
1 − 𝑕
 𝑐 𝑡
𝑙 − 𝑕𝑐 𝑡−1
𝑙  +
𝜏𝑐
1 + 𝜏𝑐
𝜏𝑡
𝑐 +
𝜏𝑙
1 + 𝜏𝑙
𝜏𝑡
𝑙
+ 𝜉𝑡
𝑤  +
𝛽
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑤 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
𝑤 +
𝜗𝑤
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑤  
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑤  
8. Definition of wage inflation  
𝜋𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑤𝑡 − 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑡 ; 
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9. Definition of c_l  
𝑐 𝑡
𝑙 =
𝜛𝑜 𝑐𝑜 −𝜍𝑐𝑡
𝑜 + 𝜛𝑛𝑜  𝑐𝑛𝑜  −𝜍𝑐𝑡
𝑛𝑜 
𝜛𝑜 𝑐𝑜 −𝜍 + 𝜛𝑛𝑜  𝑐𝑛𝑜  −𝜍
 
10. Labour demand  
𝑙𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧  𝑤𝑡
𝑧 −  
𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑠
1 + 𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑠  𝜏𝑡
𝑠 − 𝑤𝑡 −𝜙𝑙 𝑙𝑡 + 𝑧𝑡 ; 
11. Import demand  
𝑚𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧(𝑤𝑡
𝑧 − 𝑞𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠 −𝜙𝑚𝑚𝑡) + 𝑧𝑡 ; 
12. Marginal cost of composite input  
𝑤𝑡
𝑧 = 𝑎   
𝑤 𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑧
 
1−𝜌𝑧
   
𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑠
1 + 𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑠  𝜏𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝜙𝑙 𝑙𝑡 
+  1 − 𝑎   
𝑞𝑝𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑧
 
1−𝜌𝑧
  𝑞𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠 + 𝜙𝑚𝑚𝑡 ; 
13. Import price  
𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠 = 𝜂𝑡
𝑃𝑚𝑠 ; 
14. Marginal cost of production (composite and capital) 
𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼   
𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑠
𝑚𝑐𝑠𝑠
 
1−𝜌
 𝑟𝑘𝑡 +  1 − 𝛼   
𝑤𝑠𝑠
𝑧
𝑚𝑐𝑠𝑠
 
1−𝜌
 𝑤𝑡
𝑧 − 𝜂𝑡
𝑎 ; 
15. Capital demand  
𝑢𝑡 + 𝑘𝑡−1 = 𝜌𝑚𝑐𝑡 − 𝜌𝑟𝑘𝑡 +  
1
𝐷𝑃 + 𝑓𝑖𝑥
 (𝑦) − (1 − 𝜌)𝜂𝑡
𝑎 ; 
16. Composite demand  
𝑧𝑡 = 𝜌𝑚𝑐𝑡 − 𝜌𝑤𝑡
𝑧 +  
1
𝐷𝑃 + 𝑓𝑖𝑥
 (𝑦) − (1 − 𝜌)𝜂𝑡
𝑎 ; 
17. Aggregate supply of domestic product, New Keynesian Phillips Curve by domestic nominal 
price rigidity  
𝜋𝑡 =
 1 − 𝛾𝑑  1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑑 
𝛾𝑑  1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑑 
 𝑚𝑐𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡
𝑑  +
𝛽
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑑  
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 +
𝜗𝑑
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑑 
𝜋𝑡−1  
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18. Aggregate supply of export, New Keynesian Phillips Curve by nominal export price rigidity  
𝜋𝑡
𝑥𝑠 =
 1 − 𝛾𝑥  1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑥 
𝛾𝑥 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑥 
 −𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠 − 𝑞𝑡 + 𝜉𝑡
𝑥  +
𝛽
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑥  
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1
𝑥𝑠 +
𝜗𝑥
 1 + 𝛽𝜗𝑥 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑥𝑠  
19. Definition of export price  
𝜋𝑡
𝑥𝑠 = 𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠 − 𝑃𝑡−1
𝑥𝑠 ; 
20. Export demand 
𝑥𝑡 − 𝑕𝑥𝑥𝑡−1 = −𝜃𝑥𝑠𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠 + 𝑠𝑡 ; 
21. NFA  
𝑏𝑡 =  1 + 𝑖𝑡−1
∗  𝑏𝑡−1 +
𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠𝑥𝑡
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑠
+
𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠𝑚𝑡
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑠
 
 
𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡 − 𝑏𝑡−1; 
22. Real exchange rate 
𝑞𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡−1 = 𝑒𝑡 − 𝑒𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝑡 ; 
23. Credit supply curve  
𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = −𝜐𝑏𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑝𝑟
; 
24. Uncovered interest rate parity  
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑒𝑡+1 − 𝑒𝑡 ; 
25. External demand  
𝑠 = 𝜂𝑡
𝑥 ; 
 
26. Taylor rule, Monetary authority   
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜁𝑖 𝑖𝑡−1 +  1 − 𝜁𝑖 𝜁𝜋𝜋 + (1 − 𝜁𝑖)𝜁𝑒𝑒𝑡 +  1 − 𝜁𝑖 𝜁𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑟 ; 
27. Inflation: trend and cyclical parts  
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡   + 𝜋𝑡 ; 
49 
 
28. Inflation learning  
𝜋𝑡   =  
𝜌𝜋
1 + 𝑔
 𝜋𝑡−1      +  
𝑔
1 + 𝑔
 ∗ 𝜋𝑡 ; 
29. Revenues 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡 = 𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑠𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑡 + 𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑡𝑡  
𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑡 = (𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑐 𝑐𝑠𝑠)(𝜏𝑡
𝑐 + 𝑐𝑡) 
𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑙 𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑠𝑠  )(𝜏𝑡
𝑙 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡) 
𝑠𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑡 = (𝜏𝑠𝑠
𝑠 𝑤𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑠𝑠)(𝜏𝑡
𝑠 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑙𝑡) 
𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑡  
30. Expenditures 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑡 = 𝐺𝑠𝑠𝐺𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑡 + 𝑜𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑒𝑡 ; 
𝑜𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑒𝑡 = 𝜌𝑜𝑒𝑜𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑒  
31.Primary surplus 
𝑃𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑆𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑡 ; 
32. T=Total surplus, positive - Deficit 
𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑡 = 𝑃𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑆𝑡 +  1 + 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑠  𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝑡 𝐷𝑠𝑠 + 𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐷𝑡−1; 
33. Debt accumulation  
𝐷𝑡 −𝐷𝑡−1 = 𝑇𝑡 ; 
34. Deficit definition  
𝑇𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 ; 
35. Fiscal reaction functions: 
𝜏𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜌𝜏
𝑖
𝜏𝑡−1
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜌𝜏
𝑖
  𝑓
𝜏 𝑖
𝑔
 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 − 𝑓𝜏 𝑖
𝑡𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖  
𝜒𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜌𝜒
𝑖
𝜒𝑡−1
𝑖 +  1 − 𝜌𝜒
𝑖
  −𝑓
𝜒 𝑖
𝑔
 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝑓𝜒 𝑖
𝑡 𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖  
36. Equilibrium in goods market  
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𝑦𝑡 =  
𝑐𝑠𝑠
𝑦𝑠𝑠
 𝑐𝑡 +  
𝐼𝑠𝑠
𝑦𝑠𝑠
 𝐼𝑡 +  
𝐺𝑠𝑠
𝑦𝑠𝑠
 𝐺𝑡 +  𝐷𝑃
𝑥𝑠𝑠
𝑦𝑠𝑠
 𝑥𝑡 +  
𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑠
𝑦𝑠𝑠
 𝑢𝑡 ; 
37. Aggregate consumption  
𝑐𝑡 = 𝜛  
𝑐𝑠𝑠
𝑜
𝑐𝑠𝑠
 𝑐𝑡
𝑜  +  1 − 𝜛  
𝑐𝑠𝑠
𝑛𝑜
𝑐𝑠𝑠
 𝑐𝑡
𝑛𝑜 ; 
38. GDP definition  
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 =  
𝑦𝑠𝑠
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑠
 𝑦𝑡 +  𝑞𝑠𝑠
𝑥𝑠𝑠
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑠
 (𝑞𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑥𝑠 + 𝑥𝑡) −  𝑞𝑠𝑠
𝑚𝑠𝑠
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑠
 (𝑞𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡
𝑚𝑠 + 𝑚𝑡)
−  
𝑥𝑠𝑠
𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑠
 𝑥𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝑔𝑑 𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠 ; 
39. Measurement equation of employment  
Δn t = βEt Δn t+1 +
 1 − 𝛾𝑛  1 − 𝛽𝛾𝑛 
𝛾𝑛
 𝐿 𝑡 − 𝑛 𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑡
𝑛  
40. Shocks equations: 
𝜂𝑡
𝑖 = 𝜌
𝑖
𝜂
𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 ; 
 
Annex II. 
Bayes theorem is used twice and yields the posterior density (the density of parameters 
knowing the data): 
𝑝 𝜃 𝑌𝑇 =
𝑝 𝜃;𝑌𝑇 
𝑝 𝑌𝑇 
 
And 𝑝 𝑌𝑇|𝜃 =
𝑝 𝜃 ;𝑌𝑇  
𝑝 𝜃 
𝑝 𝜃 𝑌𝑇 = 𝑝 𝑌𝑇|𝜃 ∗ 𝑝(𝜃) 
Combining these identities, we can get the posterior density: 
𝑝 𝜃𝑀  𝑌𝑇 ,𝑀 =
𝑝 𝑌𝑇 𝜃𝑀 ,𝑀 ∗ 𝑝 𝜃𝑀  𝑀 
𝑝 𝑌𝑇 𝑀 
 
Where 𝑝 𝑌𝑇 𝑀  is the marginal density conditioned by the model M, 𝑝 𝜃𝑀 𝑀  is the prior, 
𝑝 𝑌𝑇 𝜃𝑀 ,𝑀  is the likelihood function that describes the density of the observed data and  
𝑝 𝜃𝑀  𝑌𝑇 ,𝑀  is the posterior. 
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Annex III: Data. 
Series: Source: Details Deflated 
with 
GDP Eurostat   GDP 
deflator 
Investment Eurostat Gross fixed capital formation GDP 
deflator 
Consumption Eurostat Household and NPISH final 
consumption expenditure 
CPI 
Export Eurostat   CPI 
Import Eurostat   CPI 
Wages INSSE calculated as averge from montly 
data 
CPI 
Public debt Eurostat     
Budget revenues Eurostat, MFP   GDP 
deflator 
Budget expenditure Eurostat, MFP   GDP 
deflator 
VAT Eurostat, MFP   CPI 
PIT Eurostat, MFP Calculated as sum between personal 
income tax and employees' social 
contributions 
GDP 
deflator 
Social contribution Eurostat, MFP Employers' actual social contributions GDP 
deflator 
Transfers Eurostat, MFP Social benefits  GDP 
deflator 
Government spending Eurostat Final consumption expenditure of 
general government 
GDP 
deflator 
Employment NBR, monthly 
reports 
calculated as averge from montly 
data 
  
Nominal interest rate NBR, monthly 
reports 
Reference interest rate   
Nominal exchange rate NBR calculated as averge from montly 
data 
  
GDP deflator Eurostat Price index - percentage change on previous period, 
based on 2000=100 and national currency 
CPI BNR, INSSE     
Note: all data series are seasonally adjusted, logged and detrended with HP filter 
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Annex IV: prior distributions, posterior distributions and mode. 
 
Source: author’s own calculation 
